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ABSTRACT
The pending matter between cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris Inter-
national (PMI) and the nation of Uruguay is the seminal case on the use of
international investment treaty arbitration to alter public health measures
largely thought to be a legitimate exercise of a state's police power. But the
case threatens to disrupt the concept of national police power, which gives
countries an implied right to regulate in the public interest. This paper
analyzes the public health tenets that should influence the resolution of
PMI v. Uruguay, and includes notes on tenets of international investment
arbitration that are particularly amenable to modification in a way that
promotes the public health and welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HE pending matter between cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris
International (PMI) and the nation of Uruguay is the seminal case
on the use of international investment treaty arbitration to alter
public health measures largely thought to be a legitimate exercise of a
state's police power.1 Although investment treaties are "primarily con-
cerned with attracting foreign investment by offering substantive protec-
tions to foreign investors," their potential chilling effect on national
health policy regulations has been a cause for concern since at least the
late twentieth century.2 The disquiet stems from the protectionist nature
of investment treaties because they seek to prevent otherwise appropriate
action that may directly or indirectly act as an expropriation of private
property for the state's benefit.3
Thus, international dispute resolution mechanisms may prove a surpris-
ing and effective jurisdiction for corporate attempts to eliminate or miti-
gate the impact of health regulations on business, at least if PMI
succeeds. This paper analyzes the public health tenets that should influ-
ence the resolution of PMI v. Uruguay. It begins with a brief background
of the case and laws at issue before turning to an examination of, and
implications for, the international public health schema, particularly in
Latin America. Although it does not seek to elucidate other underlying
legal doctrines at issue in the case, it does note several tenets of interna-
tional investment arbitration that are particularly amenable to modifica-
tion that would promote the public health and welfare.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF PMI V. URUGUAY 4
On February 19, 2010, PMI filed a request for arbitration under the
purview of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID) pursuant to the thirty-sixth article of the founding conven-
tion of that organization.5 PMI asserted that Uruguay's anti-tobacco laws
1. See, e.g., Rebecca Dreyfus & Juan Antonio Montecino, Philip Morris vs. Uruguay,
FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.fpif.org/articles/philip-mor
ris vs uruguay ("There is a wide array of support for such laws throughout the
world . . . [b]ut Philip Morris has not launched a lawsuit like this one before.");
Philip Morris Sues Uruguay Over Graphic Cigarette Packaging, NPR (Sep. 15,
2014. 4:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/goatsandsoda/2014/09/15/345540221/
philip-morris-sues-uruguay-over-graphic-cigarette-packaging ("The outcome of
this case will set the tone for other countries.").
2. Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing
Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 2-4 (2011), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663025.
3. Id. at 11.
4. For the collection of documents related to this case, see Philip Morris Brands v.
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/O/7: Available Documents,
INv. TRETA' ARB., http://www.italaw.com/cases/460 (last visited Aug. 19, 2015)
(giving links to all publicly available documents).
5. FTR Holding SA v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Request for Arbitration, J 1 (Feb. 19, 2010) sub nom. Philip Morris Brands v.
PMI V. URUGUAY
violated the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Orien-
tal Republic of Uruguay on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, a bilateral investment treaty (the Treaty). 6 The American-
based PMI was able to do so as a result of a 2001 transfer of its operations
center from Rye Brook, New York, to Lausanne, Switzerland. 7
The request for arbitration was registered on March 26, 2010, and one
year later a three-person arbitral tribunal was constituted. 8 The initial
meeting of the parties, held in May 2011, was telephonic and without
transcript. 9 By fall of that year, Uruguay had formally contested jurisdic-
tion on three counts: (1) that PMI had not complied with a requirement
that at least eighteen months pass after initiation of an attempt to settle
the dispute amicably or through the domestic judicial system; (2) that
public health regulations were expressly and impliedly excluded from the
purview of the Treaty; and (3) that PMI was not an investor in Uruguay
for purposes of the Treaty because the corporation did not contribute to
the national economy in a positive manner.10
Over the next two years, a counter-memorial,11 reply, 12 and rejoinder 13
on jurisdiction were filed. The tribunal eventually found that it did in-
deed have jurisdiction on July 2, 2013.14 A date for argument has not
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0343.pdf [hereinafter Request for Arbitration]. For the or-
ganic treaty text, see INT'L CTR. FOR SE-I'LEMENT OF INV. DIspuTEs, Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 36, in ICSID CONVENrTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES (2006) [hereinaf-
ter ICSID Convention], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/
basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf (establishing a three-step procedure for request-
ing arbitration).
6. Request for Arbitration, supra note 5, 1. For the relevant treaty provision, see
Accord entre la Conf6d6ration suisse et la R6publique orientale de l'Uruguay con-
cernant la promotion et la protection r6ciproques des investissements [Agreement
Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments], Switz.-Uru., art. 10, Oct. 7,
1988, available at http:/www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/URU_
Switzerland-f.pdf [hereinafter Treaty] (describing the procedure for resolving dis-
putes between the contracting parties).
7. Our History, PHILIP MORRIS INr'L, http://www.pmi.com/eng/about-us/pages/our-
history.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
8. Case Details, INT'L CTR. FOR SEFrLEMENT OF INv. DispUIEs, https:/icsid.world
bank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/10/7 (last
visited Aug. 21, 2015).
9. Id.
10. Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0346.pdf [hereinafter Uruguay's Memorial on
Jurisdiction].
11. Case Details, supra note 8.
12. Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case ARB/10/7,
Uruguay's Reply on Jurisdiction (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/italawl259.pdf.
13. See Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/
10/7: Available Documents, supra note 4 (noting that the rejoinder is not public).
14. Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case ARB/10/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/italawl531.pdf [hereinafter Decision on Jurisdiction].
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been set, but PMI filed a memorial on the merits in March 2014.15
III. THE URUGUAYAN REGULATIONS AT ISSUE
In 2009, Uruguay promulgated a series of measures designed to dis-
courage tobacco use. 1 6 PMI objected to three. First, the measures in-
cluded a Presidential Decree that required eighty percent of the front and
back panels of a cigarette package be filled with mandatory warning la-
bels.17 The provision, which took effect December 12, 2009, increased a
previous order by the then-president, an oncologist, that the warnings
cover half of the packaging.1 8 The decree also continued a mandate that
the warnings include images.19
One of the six images.
Front: Smoking, you stink. Smoking causes bad breath, tooth stains, and unpleasant odor
Back: Cigarettes slowly damage the senses of taste and smell.
Second, an ordinance issued on September 1, 2009, by the Ministry of
Public Health required that six specific images be used.20 That provision
15. Case Details, supra note 8.
16. Dreyfus & Montecino, supra note 1.
17. Decree No. 287/009, art. 1 (June 15, 2009) (Uru.), available at http://archivo.presi
dencia.gub.uy/_web/decretos/2009/06/CM751.pdf.
18. Id.; TODD WEILER, PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE FREE CAN., PHILIP MORRIS VS.
URUGUAY: AN ANALYSIS OF TOBACCO CONTROL MEASURES IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 4 (2010), available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/
eng-home/2010/PMlvsUruguay/Opinion-PMI-Uruguay.pdf.
19. Decree No. 287/009, supra note 17, at art. 1.
20. Ministerio de Salud Pdblica, Ordenanza Ministerial 466/2009, art. 1 (Sept.1, 2009),
available at http://www2.msp.gub.uy/andocasociado.aspx?3410,17644. For all six
images, see Ministerio de Salud Pfiblica, Nuevos Pictogramas para la Presentaci6n
PMI V. URUGUAY
took effect February 14, 2010.21
Finally, another ordinance came out on September 1, 2009, and went
into effect on February 28, 2010.22 It limited the use of a brand name to a
single line of products, such that products that might have been described
as "light" or "mild"-terms already banned-would constitute multiple
product lines. 23 Similarly, color-coding cigarette packaging as a proxy in-
dicator of the same characteristics was prohibited; each product line
could have only one color.24
For its part, PMI complied with these regulations and selected "Marl-
boro Red," its full-strength cigarette, as its single product line in
Uruguay.25
IV. COMPARING THE REGULATIONS WITH THE
GLOBAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL
PUBLIC HEALTH SCHEMA
The World Health Organization (WHO) is the appropriate transna-
tional organization from which to draw insight, because even its critics
acknowledge that it is the leader in global health policy. 26 Moreover, al-
most all formal interaction between health policy and international trade
occurs through WHO, 27 in part because it is comprised of representatives
from almost every country and is considered the authority on all health
matters for the United Nations.28 Additionally, WHO's standards might
be considered comparable to customary international law, in that they are
the accepted standard for global health policy.
WHO notes that "[t]here has long been recognition that [international]
laws are a fundamental part of public health and global public health."'29
It cites four areas of international law applicable to global public health:
(1) international trade laws, which govern the trade in pharmaceuticals;
(2) international human rights law, which aims to protect the human
rights of individuals; (3) international environment law, which addresses
environmental problems that have an impact on global health problems;
de Venta de Tabaco, http://www2.msp.gub.uylandocasociado.aspx?3410,17643 (last
visited Aug. 21, 2015).
21. WILER, supra note 18, at 4.
22. Id.
23. Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction, supra note 10, 21-22.
24. Id.
25. Id. 22.
26. See, e.g., Ilona Kickbusch, The Development of International Health Policies: Ac-
countability Intact?, 51 Soc. ScL. & MED. 979, 981 (2000) (claiming that WHO
"reinvented itself from being a specialized agency that implemented a set of tech-
nical programs to being a leader in health policy development").
27. Kelly Lee et al., Bridging the Divide: Global Governance of Trade and Health, 373
LANCET 416, 418 (2009).
28. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORKING FOR HEALTH" AN INTRODUCTION TO
riE WoR.D HEALrH ORGANIZATION 2 (2007), available at http://www.who.int/
about/brochure.en.pdf (describing WHO's global influence).
29. Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health: International Law, WORLD HEALrI
ORG., http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story061/en/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
2015] 399
400 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 21
and (4) international humanitarian law, which aims to protect the health
of combatants and non-combatants in times of armed conflict.30 Notice-
ably absent is international investment-or other economy-related-law.
Nonetheless, in 2002, WHO, through its regional Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO), began a dialogue with "key sub-regional stake-
holders," including the Central American Integration System (SICA), the
Andean Health Agency (ORAS), and South America's Common South-
ern Market (MERCOSUR). 31 Although the goal was to "scale up the
access of the world's poor to essential health services," 32 these organiza-
tions represent regional integration efforts that typically revolve around
the economic priorities of the nations that are party to the agreement.
As a result, and with the encouragement of PAHO/WHO, recognition
of the role of economic policy on health has caused an increasing empha-
sis on social initiatives throughout the Americas. Numerous suprana-
tional collaborative public health policies of all varieties have arisen
within Latin America specifically. For example, informal agreements
permit the portability of health care throughout the member nations of
MERCOSUR. 33 Cooperation amongst these nations also allows health-
care professionals to move from country to country, enhancing the availa-
bility of medical services in needed areas. 34 As might be expected,
emergent care in particular is available to traveling non-nationals without
regard to health insurance or other ability to pay.35 Indeed, the images
selected by Uruguay were largely from a database created by
MERCOSUR for the use of its member nations.36
There are formal agreements, too. In May 2014, Uruguay signed a
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the world's third "knowl-
edge hub" under the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC); the group seeks collaboration amongst governmental and non-
governmental experts in the implementation of the FCTC throughout the
30. Id.
31. Macroeconomics and Health (CMH): Achievements Through September 2004,
WoRiL HEALTH Oiw. (Sept. 2004), http://www.who.int/macrohealth/action/up-
date/achievements-paho/en/index.html.
32. COMM'N ON MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH, PAN AM. HEALTI- ORG., THE CMH
REPORT: ITS REEwANCE FOR COUNTIrIEs OF LiE LATIN AMERICA AND CARI1-
BEAN REGION 2 (2002), available at http://www.paho.org/english/hdpfhdd/ecs/cmh
.pdf. For the CMH Report in its entirety, see COMM'N ON MACROECONOMICS &
HEALTH, WORuI) HEALTI ORO., MACROECONOMICS AND HEAITII: INVESTING IN
HEAIA11 FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), available at http://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/10665/42435/1/924154550X.pdf.
33. ANDRI! MEDIC & BERNARDO WEAVER BARROS, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK,
HEALT'H POLICIES AND ECONOMIC BLOCKS 22 (2006), available at https://publica-
tions.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/5292/Health%20Policies%20and%20Econo
mic%20BIocks.pdf?sequence=1.
34. Ada Avila Assunq~o et al., Recursos humanos e trabalho em satide: os desafios de
uma agenda de pesquisa [Human Resources and Health Care: Challenges of a Re-
search Agenda], 23 CADERNOS I)E SAODE PrBLICA 193, 196 (2007) (Braz.).
35. Id.
36. Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction, supra note 10, 9 137.
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Americas. 37 Just three months later, fourteen Latin American nations
attended the inaugural meeting with hopes that "[g]lobal tobacco control
will profit greatly if government, civil society and international and re-
gional experts are able to cooperate closely." '38
Important because it is the primary legal authority reflecting the global
public health understanding of tobacco regulations, "the FCTC is the first
international treaty negotiated under the auspices of WHO. '39 In a two-
pronged approach, the FCTC emphasizes demand reduction strategies as
well as supply issues.40 Specific to the regulations at issue in PMI v. Uru-
guay are the provisions of Article 11, which govern the packaging and
labelling of tobacco products through two overarching means. Article 11
mandates that signatories outlaw any package wording that is "false, mis-
leading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about [the
cigarette's] characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions."'41 Of
particular concern were phrases such as "light" and "mild" that suggest
that some cigarettes are safer than others4 2-exactly the ban that Uru-
guay, a signatory, enacted.
Article 11 also requires that labels warn about the health effects of
smoking.43 The warnings must cover at least thirty percent of the display
area, though fifty percent is set as the ideal.44 Images are mere aspiration
under the FCTC, but, regardless, it is required that the labels rotate.4 5 As
noted above, Uruguay opted to command the use of images on cigarette
packages; the same decision has now been made by over sixty nations,
covering forty percent of the world's population.46
Although Article 11 is less than one page long, three times it invokes
national authority to implement label specifications. In Uruguay the sup-
port of national authorities already existed. Uruguay's Constitution rec-
ognizes public health as a "primordial right and supreme good," making
public health regulation a legal mandate. 47 The Uruguayan Supreme
37. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Convention Secretariat and the Minis-
try of Public Health, Uruguay, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/fctc/im
plementation/cooperation/mou-uruguay/en/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
38. Eduardo Bianco, Uruguay's FCTC Knowledge Hub Holds First Meeting, FRAME-
WORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE (Sep. 21, 2014), http://www.fctc.org/fca-news/opin
ion-pieces/183-news/1212-uruguay-s-fctc-knowledge-hub-holds-1st-meeting.
39. Foreword to WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON To-
13ACCO CONTROL, at v (June 29, 2004), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publi
cations/2003/9241591013.pdf?ua=l.
40. Id.
41. Id. at art. 11(l)(a).
42. Id.
43. Id. at art. 11(1)(b).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. CAN. CANCER SOC'Y, CIGARETIE PACKAGE HEALTI-HI WARNINGS: INTERNAITONAL
STATUS REPORT 2 (4th ed. 2012), available at http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/
files/pdfs/en/WL statusreporten.pdf.
47. See Constituci6n de la Reptiblica, art. 44 (Oct. 31, 2004) (Uru.), available at http://
www.parlamento.gub.uy/constituciones/const004.htm ("El Estado legislari en
todas las cuestiones relacionadas con la salud e higiene ptiblicas, procurando el
perfeccionamiento fisico, moral y social de todos los habitantes del pals. [The
2015]
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Court interpreted this clause when PMI attempted, almost simultaneous
with its investment arbitration action, to challenge the anti-tobacco mea-
sures as unconstitutional under Uruguayan law. 48 The case was unani-
mously dismissed on its merits, with the court noting that "an essential
duty of the state [is] to adopt all measures it considers necessary to main-
tain the collective health."'49
In addition to the constitutional duty, Uruguay cites the 1934 Organic
Law of Public Health as authoritative in its jurisdiction memorial against
PMI. 50 That law codifies the constitutional mandate, thereby laying the
statutory foundation for all public health regulation in the country. 51 The
memorial is instructive for understanding the nation's proffered
priorities:
The 1934 Organic Law reiterates the supremacy of public health, and
provides the Ministry of Public Health with full authority to take any
measures it deems necessary to maintain the health of the popula-
tion, and to control activities that harm or threaten to harm public
health. In contrast to other Ministries, the Ministry of Public Health
needs no additional legal authorization to regulate matters under its
authority.52
Thus, the national understanding of public health in Uruguay can be sum-
marized as prioritizing its interest in regulating public health and welfare
above all other national interests. And although the cigarette labeling
requirements were slowly implemented by previous administrations, the
current Uruguayan president, Jos6 Mujica, promotes the same message
globally. In his eyes, the tobacco industry is "murderous. ' '53
On a more individual level, the three regulations in controversy are
appropriate because they encourage smokers to consider quitting and dis-
courage nonsmokers from starting. Negative graphic warnings are more
effective at communicating the dangers of and preventing smoking than
those that are textual or gain-focused. 54 Additionally, even nonsmokers
State shall legislate in all matters related to public health and sanitation, ensuring
the physical, moral, and social well-being of all inhabitants of the country.]").
48. Uruguay Court Dismisses Philip Morris Tobacco Challenge, BILATERALS.ORG
(Nov. 20, 2010) http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?articlel8529; see also Request
for Arbitration, supra note 5, 8 ("The Claimants have sought to reach an amica-
ble solution by way of consultations with the Respondent, as well as through ad-
ministrative and legal action in Uruguay, but these attempts have so far proven
futile. Accordingly, the Claimants are compelled to pursue their rights by way of
arbitration.").
49. Uruguay Court Dismisses Philip Morris Tobacco Challenge, supra note 48.
50. Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction, supra note 10, 114.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Press Release, Remarks by President Obama and President Mujica of Uruguay
Before Bilateral Meeting (May 12, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2014/05/12/president-obama-s-bilateral-meeting-president-mujica-
uruguay.
54. See e.g., Maansi Bansal-Travers et al., The Impact of Cigarette Pack Design,
Descriptors, and Warning Labels on Risk Perception in the U.S., 40 AM. J. PrEV.
MED. 674, 678 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
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tend to equate both the descriptors and the colors of cigarette packaging
as indicators of the health risk of smoking a particular type of cigarette
relative to others in the product line. 55
Typical individual concerns regarding public health regulations gener-
ally do not apply to cigarette labeling requirements. Notions of bodily
integrity, autonomy of the person, and other civil rights are inapplicable
to such supply-sided regulations. Nonetheless, because the graphics can
be considered, in the words of PMI, "highly shocking images that are
designed specifically to invoke emotions of repulsion and disgust, even
horror, ' 56 it is worth noting that even some smokers have found them
difficult to stomach.57 The revulsion has been great enough that some
smokers have reported flavor changes in cigarettes, a phenomenon
termed by one public health official as a "psychological effect[ ] of mar-
keting. ' '58 Still, to the extent that the graphics are educational, it is diffi-
cult to argue that an individual right to ignorance exists and certainly to
further assert that it should outweigh the public health concern for smok-
ing cessation.
Finally, there is both a state and individual interest in economic stabil-
ity and adequate employment. In taking on PMI, Uruguay challenged a
major employer and contributor to its economy. This is reflected in one
of PMI's foundational claims regarding a reduction in sales and in the
value of its Uruguayan subsidiary.59 The corporation thus correctly pre-
dicted in its arbitration request 6° that it would close the subsidiary's man-
ufacturing facility in Uruguay.61
To counter the loss to the individual worker and the economy at large,
Uruguay instituted a program through which the former PMI employees
received training and employment as enforcers of its anti-tobacco regula-
tions.62 The nation benefited from the reduced unemployment, the po-
PMC3108248/pdf/nihms291151.pdf; Deborah Sharf & William Shadel, Graphic
Warnings are Scary, but Do They Work?, THE HEAL TN CARE BLOG (Sept. 27,
2014) http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/tag/uruguay/ (citing three studies with
findings that images can have a negative emotional effect on both smokers and
nonsmokers); but see Graphic Images 'Don't Deter Young Smokers', BBC (Sept.
13, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-23963559 (citing a study that found that
images have no effect on deterring eleven- to sixteen-year-old smokers).
55. Bansal-Travers et al., supra note 54, at 680.
56. Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction, supra note 10, 4.
57. See, e.g., Michael Kozoil, Warning: Images May Harm Your Smoking Pleasure,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Au.) (Dec. 8,2012), http://www.smh.com.au/national/
health/warning-images-may-harm-your-smoking-pleasure-20121207-2b0v3.html
(quoting a smoker that a one Australian image is "pretty vile").
58. Id.
59. PMI's Request for Arbitration, supra note 5, 87.
60. Philip Morris deja Uruguay por la "excesiva" regulaci6n [Philip Morris Leaves
Uruguay Because of "Excessive" Regulation], PORTAL DIGIrAl EL PAS (Oct. 22,
2011, 15:36), http:/fwww.elpais.com.uy/111022/pnacio-601393/nacional/philip-mor-
ris-deja-uruguay-por-la-excesiva-regulacion/.
61. PMI's Request for Arbitration, supra note 5, $ 94.
62. Ex-Philip Morris Workers Lead Uruguay Tobacco Crackdown, YAIHoo! NEws
(Jul. 29, 2014, 02:17), http://news.yahoo.com/ex-philip-morris-workers-lead-uru-
guay-tobacco-crackdown-061716376.html.
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tential increase in fines related to violations, and the positive health and
economic outcomes that enforcement of the anti-tobacco regulations
were designed to effect.
V. THE GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION AND THIS ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
VS. PUBLIC HEALTH
The goals of international investment arbitration law are not under-
mined by the notion of public health. Unlike domestic arbitration, which
frequently concerns itself with asymmetrical contractual obligation, in-
vestment treaty arbitration was created primarily to establish a neutral,
depoliticized forum. 63 Neutrality is of particular importance, because the
results of investment arbitration may have great impact on a nation's en-
tire citizenry. 64 Not only may citizens, as taxpayers, be on the hook for
litigation expenses and unfavorable awards, but recourse to right an in-
correct, politicized decision is impossible for citizens as a matter of law, as
nonparties to the original agreement.65 Arguably, to the extent that in-
ternational precedent exists, particularly in international fora, the resolu-
tion of novel issues as in PMI v. Uruguay affects the entire world.
Although this arbitral panel consists of presumably neutral arbitra-
tors,6 6 it is worth noting the background of the tribunal deciding PMI v.
Uruguay. First, by rule, PMI and Uruguay each selected one of the three
members, and then the two chosen arbitrators were to choose the third.67
PMI appointed a U.S. national, Gary Born, and Uruguay selected a na-
tional of Australia, James Crawford; Mr. Born and Mr. Crawford were
unable to agree on a third tribunal member.68 Again by rule, the ICSID
Secretary-General was therefore charged with appointing the president
of the tribunal.69 The Italian Piero Bernardini was chosen.70
The members of the tribunal have varied experience as ICSID arbitra-
tors. Mr. Born has accepted appointments to twelve international invest-
ment arbitration tribunals since 2006.71 Mr. Bernardini has participated
63. See Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under In-
vestment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future? 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
IN'i' L. & POL'Y 47, 70-73 (2005) (discussing the origins and purposes of invest-
ment treaty arbitration versus domestic arbitration); Kelley Connolly, Say What
You Mean: Improved Drafting Resources as a Means for Increasing the Consistency
of Interpretation, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNATr'i, L. 1579, 1597 (2007) ("[A]rbitration is
structured so that the parties select the arbitrators who are "required to render
decisions in an 'independent' or 'impartial' manner.").
64. Franck, supra note 63, at 75-77.
65. Id.
66. See ICSID Convention, supra note 5, at r. 1(3) ("The majority of the arbitrators
shall be nationals of States other than the State party to the dispute and of the
State whose national is a party to the dispute ... .
67. Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 14, 13.
68. Id. 14.
69. Id. 1 13.
70. Id. J 14.
71. Profile of Arbitrator Gary Born, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, http://WWw
.italaw.com/arbitrators/gary-born (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
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in twenty-eight since 1999.72 But Mr. Crawford has no previous experi-
ence as an arbitrator, having only served as an expert.73 A similar dichot-
omy exists regarding professional background: Mr. Born is a private
attorney, a partner and chair of the International Arbitration practice
group at the firm Wilmer Hale.74 The other two arbitrators are both aca-
demics, with Mr. Crawford still a sitting professor who specializes in pub-
lic international law at the University of Cambridge. 75 Before becoming
a professor at Rome University,76 Mr. Bernardini established expertise in
international trade law, oil and gas, joint ventures, and arbitration. 77
How this integration of public, private, and academic perspectives
melds is likely to affect the outcome of the case, especially because none
of the panel has a background in public health and only one member has
a history that suggests an affinity for matters of the public interest. Addi-
tionally, the likely emphasis by Mr. Bernardini, as tribunal president, on
ensuring an arbitral goal of reaching a correct decision that reflects the
law and the facts, perhaps in contrast to those who might argue that arbi-
trators must engage in a bit of bargaining, 78 may hamper the panel's abil-
ity to negotiate with each other.
VI. EFFECTS OF PMI V. URUGUAY ON PUBLIC
HEALTH REGULATION
Because this is a case of first impression, at least two of the findings on
both procedural and substantive jurisdictional issues are noteworthy for
their potential impact on global health law and policy.
First, Uruguay argued that PMI's interests in the country do not consti-
tute an investment in any case, in part because they do not make positive
contribution to the development of the country.79 Although this reading
is arguably inconsistent with the text of the Treaty, it does accord with the
ICSID convention preamble and some previous findings on the defini-
tional issue. 80 Nonetheless, the tribunal dismissed the objection, holding
that the purposes of the ICSID Convention and the Treaty and the weight
72. Profile of Arbitrator Piero Bernardini, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, http://
www.italaw.com/arbitrators/piero-bernardini (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
73. James Crawford, INVESTMENT TREATY ARITriRArION, http://www.italaw.com/ex-
perts/james-crawford (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
74. Attorney Profile of Gary Born, WILMER HALE, http://www.wilmerhale.com/
gary-born/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
75. Faculty Profile of Prof James R. Crawford, UNIV. CAMBRIDGE, http://www
.law.cam.ac.uk/people/academic/jr-crawford/19 (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
76. Profile of Prof. Piero Bernardini, INT'Il COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION, http://www.arbitration-icca.org/about/governing-board/ADVISORY-MEM
BERS/PieroBernardini.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
77. Expert R6sumd of Piero Bernardini, Inter Medical v. EBI Medical Systems (D.N.J.
1995), 1995 WL 17892070.
78. INSIDE THE BLACK Box: How ARBITRA TRIBUNALS OPERATE AND REACH
THEIR DECISIONS 41-42 (Bernard Berger & Michael Schneider, eds., 2014).
79. Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction, supra note 10, 154-55.
80. See Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 14, 178-180, 185-190, 204-209 (provid-
ing discussion on one such test); Preamble to ICSID Convention, supra note 5.
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of authority support a more flexible understanding of what constitutes an
"investment" for arbitration purposes.81
This is significant for public health regulation because the holding ren-
ders difficult any future argument that seeks, on either jurisdictional con-
dition precedent or merit-based grounds, the dismissal of a claim founded
on the harm that an industry causes. That is, the definition of the term
"investment" is, by the guidelines of this tribunal in a case understood as
seminal, so broad as to encompass all corporations doing business in a
country.
Second, there is an exception within the Treaty for public health regu-
lation: "The Contracting Parties recognize each other's right not to allow
economic activities for reasons of public security and order, public health
or morality, as well as activities which by law are reserved to their own
investors. '8 2 From Uruguay's perspective, the issue should be a straight-
forward application of national law: Because the public health is primary
to all else as a constitutional dictate, the nation could not legally have
entered into a Treaty that undermined and contradicted its domestic
law.83 Thus, argued Uruguay, public health measures are exempted from
the protections afforded to investors under the Treaty, because "[t]he
right to regulate in the public interest, including for reasons of public
health, is an inherent attribute of State sovereignty [that] exists indepen-
dent of [the Treaty]." 84
But as noted supra, the tribunal disagreed and found that Uruguay's
arguments were not a matter of jurisdictional condition precedent; rather,
they went to the merits of PMI's claim.8 5 It also found unconvincing Uru-
guay's constitutional argument, observing that "[t]he fact that Uruguay's
Constitution obliges the Government to adopt public health measures has
no bearing on whether the Respondent has breached its obligations
under the [Treaty]."'8 6
To the extent that international law may be understood as supreme to a
national law, the tribunal's determination on jurisdiction may be correct.
But as against international law, national police power has increasingly
reigned supreme. 87 For the tribunal to find otherwise sets a dangerous
precedent that could open states up to more claims that subjugate public
health regulations to private economic concerns. At minimum, it sug-
gests that investment treaties must be carefully worded to expressly per-
mit exercise of the police power as it relates to the public health. It is
significant that such a doctrinal mechanism likely already exists in the
81. Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 14, 209.
82. Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uru-
guay on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra note 6, at
art. 2(1).
83. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
84. Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction, supra note 10, 102, 127-153.
85. Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 14, 9 166.
86. Id.
87. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 2, at 1-2.
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form of the non-precluded measure (NPM), discussed infra, which can be
used to limit national liability to exceptional circumstances. 88
Regardless, finessing the public health argument as a matter for the
merits instead of addressing it as a condition precedent for substantive
jurisdiction forces an inefficient use of resources. This is particularly true
where, as in PMI v. Uruguay, the investor seems to be merely experi-
menting. 89 After all, even with very generous donations of money and in-
kind support,9° Uruguay is forced to waste a significant amount of its
financial capital to defend itself. While PMI is expending money also, it
does so as a choice, and the corporation surely anticipates not only re-
couping its litigation costs, but also ultimately profiting from the pursuit
of what it views as justice.
Unsurprisingly, then, it is widely believed that PMI's legal strategy is
political and deliberate: The corporation has attacked cigarette labeling
restrictions before as a matter of unlawful expropriation instead of debat-
ing the efficacy of the restrictions as a public health measure. 91 As long
as a corporation like PMI can effectively bully its way into a courtroom,
the entire public health schema is at risk.
VII. ARBITRAL DOCTRINE NEED NOT DISFAVOR
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Non-precluded measures (NPMs) are treaty provisions designed to
limit a nation's liability to extraordinary circumstances. 92 Doctrine
favorable to public health would suggest NPMs be read by default to in-
clude those that favor the overall health of a nation. Instead of the par-
ties to a treaty opting into health-related NPMs, they should be required
to explicitly opt out. The treaty, as a contract, would more accurately
reflect the parties' intent because it is unlikely that any nation means to
prevent itself from taking care of its population. Moreover, our collective
understanding of public health is influenced heavily by evolving technol-
88. See id. at 8-10 for a brief overview of the treatment of public health and environ-
mental regulation within the international investment doctrine.
89. E.g., Mujica: La causa de Philip Morris es inmoral, PORTAL DIGITAL EL PAS
(Apr. 8, 2012, 15:00), http://www.elpais.com.uy/120408/ultmo-635204/ultimo-mo-
mento/mujica-la-causa-de-philip-morris-es-inmoral-/ (quoting Uruguayan Presi-
dent Jos6 Mujica in his reflection that an empire like Philip Morris can afford to
pay attorneys and have an international hearing, but a small country cannot); see
also Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay:
Will Investor-State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing up in
Smoke?, 4 INv. TREATY NEws 3, 5 (July 2011), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2011/iisd-itnjuly_2011_en.pdf (describing various challenges to health regulations
via investment arbitration by the tobacco lobby).
90. See e.g., Uruguay Court Dismisses Philip Morris Tobacco Challenge, supra note 48
("Uruguay ... received the support of billionaire New York Mayor, Michael
Bloomberg, who through [Bloomberg] Philanthropies offered the country legal as-
sistance and an expert panel of advisers in its fight against Philip Morris.").
91. Porterfield & Byrnes, supra note 89, at 3.
92. William W. Burke-White & Andreas Von Staden, Investment Protection in Ex-
traordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. Ir'L L. 307, 314 (2008).
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ogy and scientific processes, such that what comprises appropriate health
regulation contemporarily may not be able to be foreseen at the time of
the signing of a treaty. An opt-out health NPM would enable countries
to clarify the presumably universal desire to have the ability to recon-
struct public health policy as science dictates.
Relatedly, more guidance from ICSID or similar supranational organi-
zations would help to establish consistency in health regulations that fall
within the realm of NPMs. It would also assist tribunals in achieving har-
monious interpretations, eliminating the "root of inconsistency in the ar-
bitral process." '93 After all, "[l]anguage generally poorly communicates a
party's intentions and fails to fully captures[sic] the party's meaning. '94
Inconsistency generates problems for investors and states alike where the
former is concerned with commercial risk, and the latter with economic
development and foreign relations. 95 Because "multilingual translations
only compound the problem," nations should "compil[e] key terminol-
ogy ... in their native language.
96
Second, most-favored nation (MFN) clauses are those that assure a na-
tion-party to an investment treaty that its investors will receive terms that
are no less favorable than those granted to the investors of other nation-
parties. MFN provisions generally apply to all components of a treaty.
The application of MFN clauses to only substantive protections is not
without controversy, 97 but the MLFN clause should never be applicable to
procedural requirements when the result is an end run around an NPM.
While a question of fact may occasionally arise regarding what constitutes
an NPM, and thus what would be an impermissible invocation of the
MIFN clause, enough authority exists to offer guidance. At minimum, this
would include regulations promulgated in direct accordance with WHO
guidelines as encapsulated in the FCTC, considered "one of the most rap-
idly and widely embraced treaties in United Nations history. 98
A more expansive understanding would permit regulations enacted
pursuant to regional integration efforts without concern for effect on pri-
vate investors. WHO and other supranational collaboratives are, in
terms of health policy, the closest thing to international custom. MFN
clauses sometimes incorporate customary international law expressly, but
they often do so implicitly.99 To hold the standards of WHO or a regional
93. Connolly, supra note 63, at 1588.
94. Id. at 1610.
95. Franck, supra note 63, at 57-58.
96. Connolly, supra note 63, at 1610.
97. See generally Mike McClure, Most Favoured Nation Clauses: No Favoured View on
How They Should Be Interpreted, Ki UWI-R ARB. Loo (Jul. 25,2011) http://kluwer-
arbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/07/25/most-favoured-nation-clauses-% E2%80%93-
no-favoured-view-on-how-they-should-be-interpreted/ (delineating the two pri-
mary views on the application of MFN clauses).
98. About the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, http://www.who.int/fctc/about/en/index
.html (last visited Aug 19, 2015).
99. See Porterfield & Byrnes, supra note 89, at 4 ("The most restrictive interpretation
of [the MFN clause] (and the position that the United States has taken since 2002)
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organization as automatic NPMs is consistent with international law as a
whole. In other words, to restrict MFNs to substantive issues after other
hurdles have been cleared is appropriate in the context of public health
norms.
Relatedly, penalties for willfully bringing a frivolous arbitration action
that tends to harm the public health would discourage the likes of PMI,
particularly when the evidence suggests the investor is merely experi-
menting. 1° ° The costs to a nation are simply too high when it is forced to
defend itself for anything approaching a frivolous, health-harming action.
And the downside does not stop there. Smaller states continue to be in a
Catch-22 when it comes to investment treaties because, although the trea-
ties bring investment monies and enhanced economic development, with-
out the treaties the states would not be subject to dispute resolution by an
investor. Instead, under the rules of the World Trade Organization, the
investor's home country would have to take up the matter. Here, that
would have saved Uruguay considerable hassle because Switzerland
likely would not have involved itself in the matter, as its anti-tobacco reg-
ulations are not dissimilar from those in Uruguay.1 0 1 Not only, then, is
the public health undermined, but investment treaties and investment
treaty arbitration are also weakened by allowing disputes like PMI's to be
brought forth. Disallowing claims like PMI's would strengthen the value
of the investment treaty and the role of arbitration as a just means of
dispute resolution between a state and a foreign investor.
A further adjustment in arbitral procedure might allow third-parties to
intervene as amici where the proceedings are related to traditional public
health regulations. Such a change would ensure that the gravity of the
public policy concerns was accurately communicated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Anti-tobacco regulations such as those promulgated by Uruguay fulfill
the aspirations of public health regulation on multiple levels of law and
policy. WHO's standards, while not specific to Uruguay, provide a useful
framework through which to view the components of health policy glob-
ally. The standards also act as a control against which national efforts can
be measured. Uruguay's national stance on cigarette labeling regulation
is arguably more liberal than international policy, but it is not out of line
with international ideals and comports with regional transnational efforts.
Individual liberties in public health are not diminished by cigarette-label-
ing regulations.
is that it merely reflects the customary international law standard of protection
that is already guaranteed to foreign investors under the right to the "minimum
standard of treatment" under international law.").
100. See supra note 89.
101. See Switzerland, TOBACCO LABELING RESOURCE CTR., http://www.tobacco-
labels.ca/currentl/switzerl (last visited Aug. 19, 2015) (summarizing Switzerland's
anti-tobacco regulations).
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PMI v. Uruguay threatens to disrupt the concept of national police
power, which gives countries an implied right to regulate in the public
interest. In particular, a win for PMI is one that necessarily favors private
economic interests over public health. Small concessions in arbitral doc-
trine would not undermine international investment but would shift the
priority to one that supports national public health law.
